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ESTIMATION AND TESTING OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY MODELS: 










This paper provides an empirical contribution to the current debate about the 
suitability of the collective model proposed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) for analysing 
intrahousehold behaviour in the labour supply context. We follow Chiappori et al.(2002) and 
we extend the model considering differences in the education level between the two members 
of the couple as a potential distribution factor. Moreover, we propose a particular parametric 
specification for the labour supply system in order to derive the restrictions imposed by the 
collective setting on observed household behaviour. The empirical results show that neither 
the unitary model nor the collective one fits the Spanish household labour supply data. 
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The choice of a framework for modelling household behaviour has become an important
topic in Family Economics. This question is of interest because it shapes our under-
standing of the household decision variables (i.e, consumption, labour supply, household
production, fertility, savings and portfolio choices) when analysing policy evaluation is-
sues. It is accepted that such a framework must satisfy a set of requirements, namely, that
(i) it embeds a structural model based on a realistic notion of a family, (ii) it is testable,
and (iii) it is integrable (i.e, the structural model can be recovered uniquely from observed
individual behaviour).
Traditionally, the standard consumer theory model, the so-called unitary model,h a s
been used to deal with the analysis of household behaviour assuming that the family
as a whole is the basic decision-making unit. Although this setting seems to be very
convenient from a technical point of view, its use in the family context has been strongly
criticized in the last two decades by several authors (Manser and Brown (1980), Apps
and Rees (1988), Chiappori (1992), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992), Browning and
Chiappori (1998)). The main criticisms are basically two. First, it has been argued that
treating the family as the representative agent violates the most elementary principle
of modern microeconomic theory: the individualism principle, which states that each
individual must be characterized by her own preferences. Second, since the unitary model
considers the family as a whole, it does not allow to raise any intrahousehold related
issues that might have a signiﬁcant eﬀe c to ne a c hm e m b e r ’ sw e l f a r e . A sac o n s e q u e n c e
of this drawback, this framework turns out to be very restrictive for performing positive
and normative analysis at intrahousehold level. To overcome this limitation, various
multiperson household models have been proposed in the literature. These models are all
based on game theory concepts since they consider that household behaviour is the result
of an interaction process among family members. However, they diﬀer in how they model
the interaction process.
In particular, we can distinguish between models that consider the interaction as a
noncooperative game and those that model it using a cooperative approach. The for-
mer (Ashworth and Ulph (1981), Browning (2000)) use the standard concept of Nash
equilibrium in noncooperative games and therefore assume that each household member
3behaves as if she were maximizing her own utility function taking the others’ behaviour
as given. Because the Nash equilibrium does not need to be Pareto eﬃcient in a nonco-
operative context, these models do not provide the most adequate scenario for analysing
family behaviour. The argument for this criticism is that Pareto eﬃciency appears to be
a very natural property for household decisions since they are made in a context where
everything is common knowledge. In this situation, it does not seem reasonable to admit
the existence of feasible opportunities for improvement that have not been exploited by
the members of the family. By contrast, in cooperative models, household behaviour is
assumed to be the outcome of a cooperative game among the family’s decision-making
members. Since at least under symmetric information the outcome of these kinds of games
is Pareto eﬃcient, they provide a more suitable framework for intrahousehold analysis.
In the cooperative context, two diﬀerent kinds of structural models have been pro-
posed. On the one hand, some authors (Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney
(1981)) have considered a bargaining model in which individuals, given their relative
bargaining power in the family, have to reach a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of the gains
obtained from the fact of living together. In this framework, various bargaining equi-
librium concepts (Nash, dictatorial, Kalai-Smorodinski) have been applied, imposing a
very particular and speciﬁc structure on observed family behaviour. This gives rise to an
important limitation of this model in performing empirical analysis since if the data re-
ject the restrictions imposed on individuals’ actions, it will not be possible to disentangle
whether it is the speciﬁc equilibrium or the model in general that causes this rejection.
On the other hand, there is an alternative approach, the so-called collective model, that
was developed by Chiappori in his seminal work in 1988 and extended by several studies
to analyse both consumption and labour supply behaviour.
In the collective setting, the family is considered as a group of individuals characterized
by their own preferences that interact between each other when making their decisions
through a certain exogenous and unobservable decision process that yields to a Pareto
eﬃcient outcome. Therefore, since the most general version of the collective model is only
based on the assumption of Pareto eﬃciency and does not impose any additional structure
on the interaction process, it provides a very attractive setting for raising questions related
to what may happen within a household (intrahousehold allocation of resources, intra-
household consumption inequality, the distribution of decision power, family formation
4and dissolution, etc). However, technically, the collective model is not so simple to deal
with. In particular, Chiappori (1988, 1992) shows that additional assumptions have to
be imposed on the nature of goods and on individual preferences for the model to satisfy
the testability and integrability requirements. In this direction, various authors (Chiap-
pori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon et al. (1995), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori
and Ekeland (2002), Chiappori et al. (2002)) propose diﬀerent approaches that allow the
diﬀerent versions of the collective model to fulﬁl these two requirements.
In the empirical context, several authors (Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et
al. (1994), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et
al. (2002), Fernández-Val (2003)) have found evidence in favor of the collective model.
Nevertheless, the choice of a framework for modelling household behaviour is still an
open question and more empirical work is required to conﬁrm that evidence. Moreover,
most of these papers are focused on testing Chiappori’s model in either consumption or
labour supply settings, but the approach still needs to be extended to other areas of
household behaviour -such as fertility, savings and portfolio choices- which to the best
of our knowledge have not been explored yet. Hence, the present analysis stems from
the need for a better comprehension of the validity of Chiappori’s model to ﬁt household
behaviour data. In this sense, our goal is to provide an empirical contribution to this
important debate in the labour supply context using Spanish data. Speciﬁcally, we adopt
a parametric approach to estimate a household labour supply system and to test the
restrictions on observed behaviour derived from the collective model. We use Spanish
data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period from 1994
to 1999.
For Spain, empirical evidence on the collective model is rather scarce. For consump-
tion, Zamora (2002a) uses the collective model to estimate the intrahousehold distribution
of private family expenditure for two kinds of couples: couples in which the wife does not
work and couples in which the wife does work. Related to this, Zamora (2002b) also uses
a collective framework to analyse the impact of female labour-force participation on the
woman’s bargaining power within the couple and, therefore, on the consumption of a set of
goods. In both studies she uses data drawn from the Spanish Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey (EPF) for 1990/91. Regarding labour supply decisions, Fernández-Val (2003) follows
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and estimates a household labour supply model using the ECHP
5for the period from 1994 to 1997. He tests the parametric restrictions derived from both
the unitary and the collective settings, and ﬁnds empirical evidence in favor of the latter.
Although our purpose is also to test the collective model’s restrictions in a parametric
context using the ECHP, the present analysis diﬀers from that of Fernández-Val (2003)
in its identiﬁcation assumptions, parametric speciﬁcation and estimation methodology.
In particular, in order to meet the identiﬁcation and testability requirement of the
collective model in a simple and robust way, we follow Chiappori et al. (2002) and
consider the existence of the so-called distribution factors. T h e s ea r ev a r i a b l e st h a th a v ea n
inﬂuence on family behaviour through their eﬀect on the intrahousehold decision process
but do not aﬀect either individual preferences or the household budget constraint. Some
examples that have been proposed in the literature are the sex ratio in the population,
several features of the divorce laws (Chiappori et al. (2002)) and diﬀerences in incomes
and ages between partners (Bourguignon et al. (1994)). In this sense, we use diﬀerences in
the education level between husband and wife as a potential distribution factor. We ﬁnd
that this variable signiﬁcantly aﬀects each individual’s labour supply decisions according
to the collective model interpretation. However, our results show that Chiappori’s model
does not ﬁt the Spanish data on household labour supply. This contradicts the empirical
ﬁndings in Fernández-Val (2003).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the unitary and collective
theoretical models are formally developed in order to facilitate the comprehension of
Chiappori’s contributions. In the collective setting, we pay special attention to the as-
sumptions that are considered to get identiﬁcation of the structural model and to derive
testable restrictions. In section 3 we present the parametric speciﬁcation of the labour
supply system proposed by Chiappori et al. (2002) and we derive the restrictions from
the collective model. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis and reports the estimation
results, which show that this parametric speciﬁcation does not ﬁt our data. Hence, in
section 5, we propose an alternative parametric model that additionally allows us to test
the unitary model. Next, each model’s parametric restrictions are derived. Section 6
presents the estimation results for the unrestricted labour supply system under the new
speciﬁcation. Section 7 reports the tests of the restrictions derived from both the unitary
and the collective models. Section 8 concludes.
62 Theoretical Models
This section presents the theoretical context that characterizes the family situation we
are interested in. We consider a family comprising two decision-making members of
working age, individual preferences are deﬁned over consumption and labour supply1 and
there is a unique private consumption good in the economy taken as numeraire. No
questions related to public consumption (children, rent or other housing expenditures),
household production or participation decisions of individuals are raised in this setting.2
Even though the importance of such issues is undoubted, we restrict our attention to
the simplest version of the collective labour supply model since we focus on individuals’
labour supply behaviour. Before developing such a model, we present the unitary model.
2.1 The Unitary Model
As we pointed out earlier, the standard consumer theory model has traditionally been
applied for analysing family behaviour. In this framework, the family is treated as the
basic decision unit even in the case of multiperson households. Hence, household prefer-
ences are represented by a unique, well-behaved utility function, U,t h a t ,a c c o r d i n gt oo u r
general assumptions, depends positively on household consumption, c,3 and negatively on
each individual’s labour supply, hi, i = m,f,w h e r em denotes the husband and f refers to
the wife. Therefore, family behaviour is the result of the following maximization problem:
1Household production is not considered since no data are available for the case of Spain.
2Based on the seminal work by Chiappori (1988, 1992), several extensions have been raised in recent
years analysing important aspects related to household labor supply decisions. Chiappori et al.(2001),
Fong and Zhang (2001) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) deal with collective labor supply models
that include public consumption goods. Apps and Rees (1996), Chiappori (1997), Blundell et al.(2000)
and Aronsson et al.(2001) extend the model to consider household production. Donni (2000, 2001) and
Blundell et al.(2002) consider nonparticipation decisions and allow for non-convex budget sets. Finally,
Mazzoco (2001) deals with intertemporal considerations in the collective context.
3Since most of the microdata surveys do not provide information on individual consumption and all
members of the household face the same price of the unique private consumption good, we can apply Hicks’
composite good theorem and assume that household’s utility function depends on aggregate consumption








f+y ≥ c (P1)
where wi, i = m,f, and y are exogenous variables that represent wages and household
nonlabour income, respectively. The price of the private consumption good is normalized
to one since it is taken as the numeraire.
Let hm(wm,w f,y) and hf(wm,w f,y) represent the system of labour supply functions
-the Marshallian labour supplies-. For both functions to be the interior solutions4 of (P1)
they have to satisfy the standard restrictions of symmetry and positive deﬁniteness of the
Slutsky matrix given by the following expressions:
Symmetry restriction:
smf = sfm (1)
Positive semideﬁniteness:
sii ≥ 0,i = m,f (2a)
smmsff − s
2
mf ≥ 0 (2b)
where sij = ∂hi
∂wj − hj ∂hi
∂y , i,j = m,f, is the compensated substitution eﬀect of the
labour supply of member i with respect to the wage of member j.
Apart from this set of restrictions, the unitary model imposes the so-called Income
Pooling Hypothesis. This condition states that the source of nonlabour income plays no
role in the household allocation problem. If we deﬁne ym,y f as husband’s and wife’s
nonlabour income, respectively, such that ym + yf = y, this hypothesis will be given by
the following set of equations:










,i , j = m,f (3)
which means that ym and yf have the same eﬀect on each individual’s labour supply.
The Income Pooling Hypothesis has been strongly questioned in this literature since
several studies have found empirical evidence against it (Altonji et al. (1989), Bourguignon
et al. (1993), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Fernández-Val (2003)). Nevertheless, we assume
implicitly that this hypothesis is generally satisﬁed by the observed household behaviour
and, therefore, we consider the household nonlabour income as a whole in the present
analysis. We proceed in this way for two reasons. First, conceptually, it seems reasonable
to think that individuals’ nonlabour incomes are pooled within the household, specially
if the couple has living together for several years. Moreover, we are really sceptical about
the idea that the source of nonlabour income could be identiﬁed after several years of
cohabitation in a family. Hence, the Income Pooling Hypothesis seems to be a realistic
assumption to impose on intrahousehold behaviour.5 Second, regarding the empirical
analysis, the distinction between each member’s nonlabour income reported by some data
surveys could turn out to be artiﬁcial or ﬁctitious since it may be inﬂuenced or distorted
by ﬁscal incentives. As a result, this information might not reﬂect the real economic
situation of the family concerning nonlabour income and, therefore, might not be suitable
for testing the Income Pooling Hypothesis. These two points lead us to suggest that the
distinction between each individual’s nonlabour income should not be considered in the
analysis of intrahousehold behaviour.
2.2 The Collective Model
The collective model was developed by Chiappori in his seminal work in 1988 to overcome
the drawbacks of the unitary model. In addition, since the collective model relies on very
general assumptions, it overcomes the empirical limitations of the multiperson-bargaining
contexts that impose a very particular and restrictive structure on family choices. There
are two basic assumptions that characterize household behaviour in the collective setting.
5Aronsson et al.(2001) show that the income pooling hypothesis can not be rejected for Swedish data
from 1984 and 1993.
9First, the individual is the basic decision unit and is represented by her own preferences.
Second, collective decisions lead to a Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium. Therefore, the collective
model describes the family as a group of two individuals with potentially diﬀerent ratio-
nal preferences.6 These individuals interact with each other when making their decisions
through a certain exogenous and unobservable decision process that yields a Pareto eﬃ-









f + y ≥ c
m + c
f (P2)
where Um and Uf are the individual’s utility functions and µ is a weighting factor.
In the most general version of the collective model, individual preferences are assumed to
be altruistic. Altruism implies that each member of the couple not only cares about her
o w nd e c i s i o nv a r i a b l e sb u ta l s oa b o u tt h o s e of her partner, which seems a very natural
situation in the family context. Therefore, each member’s preferences are represented
by a utility function, Ui = Ui(cm,c f,h m,h f),i= m,f, that is well-behaved in all its
arguments. The weight component, µ, represents the importance of each member of
the couple in the intrahousehold decision process. Under the collective setting, µ is a
function of all the variables that aﬀect each member’s bargaining power -wages, household
nonlabour income and the vector of the so-called distribution factors, s- and it is assumed
to be continuously diﬀerentiable in all its arguments, µ(wm,w f,y,s) ∈ [0,1]. Therefore,
wm,w f,y and s will determine the ﬁnal location of the solution on the Pareto frontier
through their inﬂuence on the collective decision process. The term distribution factor
is used in this literature (Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002)) to
denote variables that have an inﬂuence on family behaviour through their eﬀect on the
6Notice that in this analysis we only consider the existence of two decision makers in the family: the
husband and the wife. Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) extend the collective model to the case in which
the family is composed of a larger set of decision-making individuals. They analyse the conditions under
which it is possible to get identiﬁcation of this model.
10intrahousehold decision process but that do not aﬀect either individual’s preferences or
the household budget constraint.7 As we will discuss later, the role of such variables
turns out to be crucial for the identiﬁcation of the structural model and the possibility of
deriving testable restrictions in the present context.
Since this setting does not impose any additional assumption on the intrahousehold
decision process, it provides a very natural framework for analysing family behaviour.
However, its main limitation comes from the fact that the structural model is not uniquely
identiﬁed under this general approach. Moreover, testable restrictions cannot be derived
in a parametric context unless there are at least two distribution factors (see Bourguignon
et al. (1995), Chiappori et al. (2002)). Therefore, in order to get identiﬁcation of the
structural model, additional assumptions are required. In particular, Chiappori (1988) as-
sumes that individual preferences are either egoistic or caring à la Becker. If members are
egoistic, they only care about their own decision variables and, therefore, Ui = Ui(ci,h i),
i = m,f. If preferences are caring à la Becker, each member not only cares about her
own decision variables but also about her partner’s welfare and, as a result, her utility
will have the following form: Wi = Wi(ci,h i,   Uj(cj,h j)),i , j= m,f; i  = j. Although
assuming that preferences are caring a la Becker seems more realistic in the family con-
text, we consider egoistic preferences in order to simplify the notation since the same
results concerning the testability and integrability requirements hold under both kinds of
preferences (see Chiappori (1988), (1992)).
Under this separability assumption on individuals’ preferences, Chiappori (1992) shows
that Pareto eﬃciency implies that the intrahousehold collective process can be interpreted
as a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage, both members of the couple share the household
nonlabour income according to an exogenous and unobservable sharing rule that reﬂects
each individual’s bargaining power in the household. Speciﬁcally, that sharing rule is char-
acterized by a function φ(wm,w f,y,s) that depends on wages, the household nonlabour
income and the vector of distribution factors and represents the fraction of the nonlabour
income that goes to the husband. In the second stage, once the total nonlabour income
has been allocated between the individuals, each member solves her own maximization
problem:











where i = m,f, φ
m = φ, and φ
f = y − φ. This interpretation relies on the Second
Fundamental Welfare Theorem that states that, in the absence of externalities, any Pareto
eﬃcient allocation can be reached through a competitive equilibrium given an appropriate
wealth distribution (represented by the sharing rule). Formally, Chiappori (1992) shows
that, under the assumption of egoistic preferences, the sharing rule function φ(wm,w f,y,s)
exists and the maximization problems (P2) and (P3) are equivalent. As a result, for








(wf,y− φ(wm,w f,y,s)) (4b)
where hi∗,i = m,f, are the Marshallian labour supply functions that correspond to
the second stage of the problem.
Under this framework, Chiappori et al. (2002) show that it is possible to derive
testable restrictions on observed individuals’ labour supply behaviour and to recover the
sharing rule function up to an additive constant from the system (4a)-(4b). Even without
distribution factors, Chiappori (1988, 1992) shows that, under the assumption of egoistic
preferences, the model is identiﬁed and the testability requirement is satisﬁed. Further-
more, it is possible to solve the integrability problem, recovering the individual’s utility
functions and the sharing rule up to an additive constant from such observed behaviour.
However, since these identiﬁcation and testability results are based on second and third-
order partial derivatives of the individual’s labor supplies, respectively, it might not be
possible to derive such restrictions for certain parametric speciﬁcations of the model. In
12this direction, Chiappori et al. (2002) extend the household labor supply model by allow-
ing for distribution factors. They show that the incorporation of such variables provides
a simpler and more robust method of obtaining identiﬁcation and deriving testable re-
strictions relying on ﬁrst and second-order partial derivatives of the individuals’ labour
supplies8, respectively. In addition to this, it is important to point out that only one dis-
tribution factor is needed for this testability and integrability result to hold under egoistic
preferences.
In our analysis, we only consider one distribution factor. In particular, we claim that
the intrahousehold decision process depends on the diﬀerences in the education level be-
tween the members of the couple. Although the education level of each individual may
aﬀect her own preferences, her spouse’s education level does not. Thus, it is possible to
treat the diﬀerences in education as a variable that aﬀects both members’ labor supply
behaviour through the sharing rule but without inﬂuencing either individual preferences
or the household budget constraint. A deeper explanation of the deﬁnition and the inter-
pretation of this variable is provided in the empirical part of the analysis. Since we focus
on a similar setting to that of Chiappori et al.(2002) -they consider the sex ratio and the
divorce laws as distribution factors-, we follow their result, given in Proposition 1 (see
Appendix A), in order to get identiﬁcation and derive testable restrictions.
As Chiappori et al. (2002) state, the conditions in Proposition 1 are nonparametric
since no assumptions have been imposed on the functional form of the utility functions.
However, the estimation and testing of such conditions is much easier if it is performed
in a parametric framework considering a particular functional form for the model. The
next section presents a speciﬁc representation of the labour supply system that allows us
to test the restrictions imposed by the collective setting on the observed labor supplies
and to recover the underlying structural model if such restrictions are accepted.
3 Parametric Speciﬁcation
Under the parametric approach, the choice of the particular functional form for the unre-
stricted labor supply system should be based on several criteria. First, it should display
8See Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) for a further review of iden-
tiﬁcation for diﬀerent versions of the collective model.
13a certain degree of ﬂexibility in the responses of labour supplies to changes in wages in
order to provide a proper characterization of the data. Second, it should not impose the
restrictions of the collective model, and these restrictions must be empirically testable.
Third, it should be possible to recover a closed-form for the underlying structural model
under the collective setting (both individuals’ indirect utility functions and the sharing
rule).
According to these requirements, as a ﬁrst approximation to the problem we follow
Chiappori et al. (2002) and use a semilogarithmic speciﬁcation for the unrestricted labor
supply system:
h
m = α0 + α1 logwm + α2 logwf + α3 logwm ∗ logwf + α4y + α5s (5a)
h
f = β0 + β1 logwm + β2 logwf + β3 logwm ∗ logwf + β4y + β5s (5b)
In order to derive the restrictions imposed by the collective model, we apply conditions
(A1a)-(A1h) to the unrestricted parametric model (5a) and (5b). Under this framework,
there is only one parametric restriction given by the following expression (see Chiappori







It easy to check that this restriction comes from condition (A1f) while the rest of the
conditions (A1a)-(A1h) are fulﬁlled trivially. As Proposition 1 states, if restriction (6) is



















α2 + α3 logwm
wf
, (7)
where ∆ = α4β3−α3β4. Solving this system of partial diﬀerential equations, we obtain




(α3β1 logwm + α2β3 logwf + α3β3 logwm logwf + α4β3y + α5β3s)+k
(8)
where k is a parameter that cannot be identiﬁed without additional assumptions and
may depend on preference factors.
Moreover, following Stern (1986), we can integrate the system (4a) and (4b), assuming
































where the structural preferences parameters can be recovered as functions of the labour




α3 , and f =
α3β2−α2β3
α3 . The coeﬃcients c and g are functions of preference factors and cannot be
identiﬁed without additional assumptions.
Therefore, if the restrictions of the collective model are not rejected by our data, it
is possible to obtain a characterization of the intrahousehold allocation process and the
preferences of the individuals up to an additive constant. This characterization turns out
to be a fundamental tool for family welfare analysis.
154 Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide the main insights concerning the main points of the empirical
analysis: the data, the sample selection, the empirical model, the econometric problems
that arise and the estimation methodology applied in the present analysis.
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). This data set
provides comparable statistical annual information about the labour status and welfare
level of households in the EU-15 countries allowing their social and economic situation to
be analysed. In particular, we select a sample of couples living in Spain for the period from
1994 to 1999. However, since income variables refer to the period prior to the interview
and the remaining data refer to the current period, the last year is lost for the estimation.
We do not exploit the panel structure of the data because we do not analyse intertemporal
considerations.9 Instead, we use the observations as a pooled cross-section ignoring the
temporal dimension of the survey.10 We select couples with both members aged less than
65, continuously working as employees throughout the year. We end up with a sample of
1879 couples on whom information about all the variables that we consider in the analysis
is available.
4.2 Empirical Model
According to parametric speciﬁcation (5a) and (5b), we consider the following empirical
model:
h
m = α0 + α1 logwm + α2 logwf + α3 logwm ∗ logwf + α4y + α5s + α
 
6zm + εm (10a)
h
f = β0 + β1 logwm + β2 logwf + β3 logwm ∗ logwf + β4y + β5s + β
 
6zf + εf (10b)
9Furthermore, using the panel structure of the database would dramatically reduce the sample size to
165 observations in each year.
10We treat one household at diﬀerent points in time as diﬀerent observations. Since observations will
not be serially independent, we control for autocorrelation in the estimation procedure.
16where zi,i= m,f, is a vector of observable sociodemographic characteristics and
(εm,εf)  are the error terms that include individuals’ unobservables and are allowed to be
correlated.
The dependent variables are each member’s weekly hours of work. With respect to the
explanatory variables, hourly wage rates (wm,w f) are computed as the ratio of monthly
earnings and the number of hours of work per month. Annual household nonlabour income
(y) includes non-work private income (capital income, assigned property/rental income
and private transfers received) and total social insurance receipts (old-age/survivors’ ben-
eﬁts, family-related allowances, sickness/invalidity beneﬁts, education-related allowances
and any other personal beneﬁts). All income variables have been deﬂacted by the annual
mean of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) base 1992 and are expressed in euros. In ad-
dition to this, in order to control for observable individual heterogeneity we include in
the labour supply of each member some sociodemographic characteristics such as age, age
squared, a set of dummies for the education level -Educ1 for primary schooling or without
schooling, Educ2 for high school and Educ3 for graduate and postgraduate studies-11 and
two household fertility variables, the number of children less than 6 years old and the
number of children between 6 and 18 years old.
As mentioned above, the distribution factor, s,t h a tw ec o n s i d e ri nt h i sa n a l y s i si s
given by a cathegorical variable that reﬂects the diﬀerences in education level between
the members of the couple.12 Speciﬁcally, it is deﬁned as follows
11Since a constant term is included in the regression system, Educ1 is the default dummy.
12We have tried with additional variables that could be seen as potential distribution factors for Spanish
couples: diﬀerences in ages, in potential unemployment spell before the ﬁrst interview year and in the
number of years in the current position. However, none of these were signiﬁcant and they could not
t h e r e f o r eb eu s e da sd i s t r i b u t i o nf a c t o r s .
17s =

                  
                  
1 if F = G and M = P
2 " F = G and M = H
3 " F = H and M = P
4 " F,M = G
5 " F,M = H
6 " F,M = P
7 " F = H and M = G
8 " F = P and M = H
9 " F = P and M = G
where F and M represent the highest level of education reached by the woman and
the man, respectively. These variables can take three diﬀerent values: G for graduate and
postgraduate studies, H f o rh i g hs c h o o lo re q u i v a l e n ta n dP for primary schooling or no
schooling. Therefore, with this particular deﬁnition of variable s,13 we reﬂect not only that
members’ education levels may diﬀe rb u ta l s oh o wb i gt h e s ed i ﬀerences are.14 We claim s
to be interpreted as a potential distribution factor since it seems realistic for the diﬀerences
in education level between the members of the couple to aﬀect the intrahousehold decision
process by inﬂuencing each individual’s relative bargaining power. Although the level of
education is a preference factor, and therefore appears as an explanatory variable in each
individual’s labor supply equation, the spouse’s level is not. As a result, the diﬀerences
in education level can be seen as aﬀecting the intrahousehold decision process but not
individuals’ preferences. Furthermore, in order for s to be a distribution factor, and given
that it is increasing in the relative education level of the man, it must aﬀect the man’s
labour supply negatively and the woman’s labour supply positively. The interpretation
is as follows: as s increases, the man’s education level becomes higher relatively to his
13We must point out that the choice of a discrete variable as a distribution factor is not compatible
with the requirement of continuously diﬀerentiability of the sharing rule with respect to all its arguments.
The natural solution to this problem would be to use continuous information on education (i.e, number
of years of schooling). Unfortunately, such information is not provided by our survey. Therefore, as
Chiappori et al.(2002) states, the test of the collective restrictions is approximative.
14It could be argued that the order of the nine categories in s h a sb e e ne s t a b l i s h e di na nad hoc fashion.
However, this order appears to be appropriate since equivalent predicted eﬀects on individuals’ labour
supplies are obtained including the corresponding set of nine dummy variables in the regression system.
18spouse’s level. This implies a higher relative decision power for the man which allows him
to get a larger share of the household nonlabour income. This will lead to a lower number
of hours of work for the man as a result of a standard income eﬀect assuming that leisure
is a normal good. The inﬂuence of s on the woman’s labor supply function will have the
opposite sign following the same argument. In appendix B we present some descriptive
statistics of the variables used in this analysis.
4.3 Estimation Methodology and Empirical Results
We start by pointing out some econometric problems that may arise in this analysis.
First, wages are considered as endogenous variables since they are computed as the ratio
of monthly earnings and monthly hours of work giving rise to the so-called "division bias".
Moreover, potential measurement errors may arise in such reported variables and can be
a c c u m u l a t e di nt h ec o m p u t a t i o no fh o u r l yw age rates. In order to deal with this prob-
lem, we apply instrumental variables techniques for estimating the model. Speciﬁcally,
following Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Chiappori et al. (2002), we instrument wages
using third-order polynomials in age, their interactions with the schooling dummies and,
ﬁnally, the number of years the individual has been working at her current position (this
variable is named speciﬁce x p e r i e n c eby Fernández-Val (2003)). Even though there is no
consensus in the literature about the exogeneity of household nonlabour income, children
variables and experience, we treat them as exogenous given the empirical evidence for
Spain in Fernández-Val (2003).15
Second, since we restrict our attention to the interior solutions of problem (P2) for
both individuals’ hours of work, to account for nonparticipation decisions and avoid sam-
ple selection biases we implement a two-stage Heckman correction methodology for each
member. The estimation results for the Probit models are presented in Appendix C.
We estimate the system of equations (10a) and (10b) by the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). We use the Optimal GMM estimator based on the two stage least
squares residuals to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms
(see White (1982), Ogaki (1993), Chiappori et al. (2002), Arellano (2003)). This proce-
15In addition, the empirical results provided in Section 6 show that the Sargan test does not reject the
exogeneity of all these variables.
19dure guarantees desirable asymptotic properties, i.e, eﬃciency under heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. Furthermore, distributional assumptions on the error terms are not
needed.
The estimation results and the Sargan statistic for testing the overidentifying restric-
tions are presented in Table 1:
Table 1. Unconstrained Labor Supply Model
Semilogarithmic Speciﬁcation. GMM Parameter Estimates
Men (j = m) Women (j = f) Men (j = m) Women (j = f)
Constant 69.2∗∗ 41.45∗ Educ2j 2.15∗∗ 4.85∗∗
(6.08) (7.04) (0.73) (1.53)
log(wm)∗log(wf) 4.45∗ 11.87∗ Educ3j 2.07∗ 3.80
(2.31) (2.65) (1.13) (2.57)
log(wm) -8.36∗∗ -23.87∗ Children < 6 0.25 -2.55∗∗
(3.85) (4.36) (0.34) (0.68)
log(wf) -11.64∗∗ -14.62∗ Children618 0.30 -1.39∗∗
(4.09) (4.06) (0.24) (0.38)
y 0.74∗∗ -0.22 smf -0.53∗ 0.35
(0.35) (0.16) (0.16) (0.28)
Agej -2.89 10.96∗∗ λj -2.33 5.72∗∗




Sargan Test 54.95 (0.007) Sample 1874
Note: Standard errors for parameter estimates and p-value for Sargan Test displayed in
parentheses. (*) Signiﬁcant at 10%. (**) Signiﬁcant at 5%. Age has been divided by 10.
First of all, it is worth pointing out that the Sargan test rejects the validity of instru-
ments. Therefore, these parameter estimates are not consistent and cannot be used for
inference analysis. Among the instruments used to control for the endogeneity of wages,
we consider the so-called speciﬁc experience as the most likely candidate to be related
to such rejection. In fact, if we do not include the speciﬁce x p e r i e n c ea sa ni n s t r u m e n t ,
the Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions. However, most of the
variables become nonsigniﬁcant and the ﬁt of the regression worsens considerably. A
plausible explanation for the endogeneity of speciﬁc experience is that the errors in (10a)
and (10b) might include additional terms in wages which have not been considered in the
semilogarithmic speciﬁcation of the labour supply function. If this is the case, the speciﬁc
experience will be correlated with the error terms due to its strongly correlation with
wages. In order to avoid this speciﬁcation problem, we present an alternative functional
20form for the unconstrained labour supply system in the next section that ﬁts the observed
behaviour more closely.
5 An Alternative parametric model
Speciﬁcally, we propose the following labour supply system characterized by a quadratic
speciﬁcation in wages:




f + α3wmwf + α4wm + α5wf + α6y + α7s (11a)




f + β3wmwf + β4wm + β5wf + β6y + β7s (11b)
This alternative parametric model has several advantages over the semilogarithmic
speciﬁcation. First, it provides a larger degree of ﬂexibility since it includes the quadratic
terms in wages which play an important role in labour supply equations as it will be shown
below. Second, since the quadratic form is linear in parameters, it is straightforward to
estimate by linear regression and to provide a direct interpretation of wages and nonlabour
income’s parameters. Third, it allows to derive and test not only the collective model but
also the unitary model.16 In addition to this, it is possible to derive a closed-form for the
structural model both under the collective and the unitary approaches (the household’s
indirect utility function for the unitary model and each member’s indirect utility function
and the sharing rule for the collective setting).
Next, we derive the restrictions and the structural model consistent with each frame-
work.
5.1 The Unitary Model
As pointed out in Section 2.1, the unitary framework treats the family as the basic
decision-making unit and does not allow any questions related to the intrahousehold
16As Chiappori et al.(2002) point out, the unitary model imposes very unrealistic restrictions on labour
supply behaviour under the semilogaritmic form. Therefore, it does not make sense to test such restric-
tions under that speciﬁcation.
21allocation process. Therefore, its ﬁr s ti m p l i c a t i o no nt h ee m p i r i c a lm o d e lg i v e nb y( 1 1 a )
and (11b) is the non-existence of distribution factors. As a result, diﬀerences in level of
education will have no eﬀect on individuals’ labour choices, which means that
α7 = β7 =0 (12)
Moreover, conditioning on (12), we know that (11a) and (11b) are the solution of
problem (P1) if and only if the symmetry conditions of the Slutsky matrix given by
(1) hold. Imposing such conditions on (11a) and (11b), we obtain the following set of
restrictions:
β1α6 = α1β6 (13)
β2α6 = α2β6
β3α6 = α3β6
α3 − α6β4 =2 β1 − α4β6
2α2 − α6β5 = β3 − β6α5
α5 − α6β0 = β4 − α0β6
I ft h e s ee q u a t i o n sa r ef u l ﬁlled, it is possible to recover the underlying structural model
from the restricted labour supply system by solving the integrability problem. Following
Stern (1986), we obtain that the household’s indirect utility function takes the form
v(wm,w f,y)=e




f + θ8wmwf)) (14)
Applying Roy’s identity on (14) (hi(wm,w f,y)=
vwi
vy i = m,f), we get the following











f − θ2θ8wmwf − (θ2θ4 + θ8)wm − (θ2θ5 +2 θ7)wf + θ2y − (θ2θ3 + θ5)
(15b)
From system (15a) and (15b), we can derive the structural parameters (θi,i=1 ,...,8)
as functions of the reduced-form parameters (αi,βi,i =1 ,...,6) in (11a) and (11b) and
get a full identiﬁcation of individual preferences consistent with the unitary framework.
5.2 The Collective Model
We apply Proposition 1 in Chiappori et al. (2002) to derive the restrictions imposed by
the collective framework under the new parametric speciﬁcation given by (11a) and (11b):
A =















Then, if C  = D, conditions (A1a)-(A1f) are necessary and suﬃcient for (11a) and
(11b) to be the solution of problem (P2). As Chiappori et al. (2002) state, condition
C  = D is likely to be satisﬁed. On the one hand, the eﬀect of the distribution factor
has opposite signs for the man’s and the woman’s labour supply, so the ratio α7
β7 must
be negative. On the other hand, since α6
β6 represents the ratio of the eﬀect of household
nonlabour income on each member’s labour supply, it should be positive provided that
23leisure is a normal good for both individuals. Under this condition, (A1a)-(A1f) gives rise







which comes from (A1f) since the previous conditions hold trivially. Therefore, we
have shown that the predictions of the collective model are robust to both parametric
speciﬁcations.
In addition, if restriction (16) is satisﬁed, the partial derivatives of the sharing rule
















(2α2wf + α3wm + α5), (17)









f + α3β3wmwf + α3β4wm + (18)
α5β3wf + α6β3y + α7β3s)+k
where k is a parameter that cannot be identiﬁed without additional assumptions and may
depend on preference factors.
24Following Stern (1986), it is possible to recover (up to an additive constant) each
individual’s indirect utility function from the reduced-form given by (4a) and (4b) under





m + cwm + d)) (19a)
υ
f(wf,y− φ)=e
fwf((y − φ) − (gw
2
f + hwf + p)) (19b)















∆ . Since the coeﬃcients d and p may be functions of
preference factors they cannot be identiﬁed without additional assumptions.
6 Empirical Model and Estimation Results
Given the parametric labour supply system (11a) and (11b), the empirical model takes
the following form




f + α3wmwf + α4wm + α5wf + α6y + α7s + α
 
8zm + εm (20a)




f + β3wmwf + β4wm + β5wf + β6y + β7s + β
 
8zf + εf (20b)
where, similarly to (10a) and (10b), zi,i= m,f, capture each individual’s observable
demographic characteristics and (εm,εf)  include the unobservables. We estimate (20a)
and (20b) by Optimal GMM considering the same list of instruments as in the semiloga-
rithmic speciﬁcation and controlling for sample selection problems. The estimation results
are reported in Table 2:
25Table 2. Unconstrained Labor Supply Model
Quadratic Speciﬁcation. GMM Parameter Estimates
Men (j = m) Women (j = f) Men (j = m) Women (j = f)
Constant 58.93∗∗ 29.42** Age2
j 0.14 -0.92∗∗
(5.74) (7.15) (0.35) (0.45)
w2
m 0.08∗∗ 0.04 Educ2j 2.52∗∗ 3.76∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.83) (1.54)
w2
f -0.05 -0.20 Educ3j 2.43∗∗ 2.70
(0.11) (0.15) (1.21) (2.61)
wmwf 0.16 0.38∗∗ Children < 6 0.37 -1.62∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.35) (0.69)
wm -2.29∗∗ -3.80∗∗ Children618 0.20 -1.02∗∗
(0.89) (0.80) (0.26) (0.37)
wf -1.40 0.94 smf -0.55∗∗ 0.58∗∗
(1.05) (1.41) (0.18) (0.29)
y 0.55 -0.11 λj -1.12 2.73
(0.39) (0.17) (2.45) (2.28)
Agej -1.18 6.57∗
(3.01) (3.38)
Sargan Test 40.63 (0.058) Sample 1879
Note: Standard errors for parameter estimates and p-value for Sargan Test displayed in
parentheses. (*) Signiﬁcant at 10%. (**) Signiﬁcant at 5%. Age has been divided by 10.
First of all, it is important to notice that the Sargan statistic does not reject the
overidentifying restrictions at the 5% level, which conﬁrms the validity of the instruments
and the consistency of the parameter estimates. Furthermore, even though quadratic
terms in wages are not individually signiﬁcant -except the square of the man’s wage,
which turns out to be signiﬁcant in his own labour supply-, they are jointly signiﬁcant
together with the cross-term and the linear terms in both equations.
Household nonlabour income does not appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on individu-
als’ labour supply decisions whereas the eﬀe c to fa g ei so n l ys i g n i ﬁcant for females. With
respect to education level, both high school schooling and graduate studies dummy vari-
ables are signiﬁcant for men with a positive sign. For women, only the dummy variable
for high school is signiﬁcant, and it has a positive sign. This means that females who have
reached high school work more hours a week than those who only have primary schooling.
However, the highest level of education does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the number of hours
of work. In addition, fertility variables only have a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on women’s
labour supply and that eﬀect is larger for children less than six years old.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcient estimates for the diﬀerences in education level between
the members of the couple conﬁrm the theory of the distribution factors. In particular,
26we obtain that this variable strongly aﬀects both individuals’ labour supplies according
to the distribution factor interpretation. Hence, these estimates support the hypothesis
t h a tt h e r ea r ev a r i a b l e st h a tm a yi n ﬂuence household decisions through their eﬀects on
the intrahousehold allocation process.
Finally, since neither of individuals’ inverse Mills ratio is signiﬁc a n t ,w ec o n c l u d et h a t
there are no sample selection problems.
In order to check if these results reasonably describe household labour supply be-
haviour in Spain, Table 3 reports some statistics of the predicted labour supply elastici-
ties:
Table 3. Predicted Labor Supply Elasticities.
Mean Std. Dev Median Min 25 th Quantile 75th Quantile Max
εm
wm 0.001 0.205 -0.062 -0.251 -0.097 0.023 2.976
Men εm
wf -0.116 0.106 -0.094 -1.064 -0.154 -0.063 0.581
εm
y 0.005 0.018 0.0003 0 0 0.003 0.396
ε
f
wm -0.163 0.216 -0.186 -0.930 -0.257 -0.096 1.818
Women ε
f
wf 0.140 0.250 0.114 -2.164 0.063 0.210 2.370
ε
f
y -0.001 0.005 -0.00007 -0.136 -0.0009 0 0
For men, wage elasticities are on average close to zero since they react slightly to
changes in economic conditions in the labour market. However, even though the elastici-
ties are not very large for women either, they reﬂect the fact that married women are more
sensitive to wage variations than men. Furthermore, on average, both kinds of individu-
als work more hours when their own wages increase and reduce their labour supply when
the spouse’s wages increase. In addition, elasticity with respect to household nonlabour
income is zero, which means that neither men’s nor women’s labour supply decisions are
aﬀected by changes in the nonlabour income in the household.
These results are close to the ones provided by Fernández-Val (2003), who uses the
same database for Spain, although he obtains a larger own-wage elasticity for woman
(0.309). This diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that we restrict our sample to couples
with both members continuously working throughout the period whereas Fernández-Val
(2003) extends the selection to couples in which both individuals work a positive number
of hours a year. As a result, it seems reasonable to think that for such a wider sample,
women are on average more sensitive to wage variations.
277 Tests of the Unitary and Collective Models
Given the empirical results reported in Table 3 for the unrestricted labour supply system
(20a) and (20b), we perform some tests to determine whether the unitary and collective
models’ predictions are adequate or not for analysing Spanish household labour supply
behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we test the non-existence of distribution factors (12) and the
symmetry of the Slutsky matrix (1) for the unitary model, and restriction (16) for the
collective approach.
Table 4 presents the statistics and the p-values for the tests of these coeﬃcient restric-
tions:
Table 4. Inference Results.
Unitary Model Statistic P-value
No distribution Factors 12.47 (0.002)
Symmetry(1) 3.35 (0.764)
Collective Model (2) 4.62 (0.031)
Collective Model (3) 6.25 (0.012)
Note: Unitary model restrictions are tested using Wald tests. (1) We test the symmetry
of the Slutsky matrix conditioning to the non-existence of distribution factors. The collective
model restriction is tested using a Wald test (2) and a Pseudo-likelihood ratio test (3).
For the unitary model restrictions, we perform Wald tests. In particular, we reject the
non-existence of distribution factors (the p-value takes a value of 0.002). In the present
analysis, this means that the diﬀerences in education level between members are strongly
signiﬁcant in their labour supply choices. Therefore, this result shows evidence against the
suitability of the unitary model for analysing family behaviour since it does not consider
any information related to the intrahousehold allocation process. Under this situation,
t h er e s u l tf o rt h es y m m e t r yo ft h eS l u t s k ym a t r i xi sn o ti n f o r m a t i v ea ta l ls i n c ew ei m p o s e
(12) to test it, and this restriction is rejected by the data.
For the collective model, since condition (16) is a nonlinear restriction and the Wald
test is not invariant to reparameterizations,17 we also perform a Pseudo-likelihood ratio
test. Both tests reject the restrictions imposed by the collective model considered in the
17As Wooldridge (2002) states, this lack of invariance cannot be ignored since it may explain the poor
ﬁnite sample properties of the Wald statistic for testing nonlinear hypothesis. For a further discussion
see Gregory and Vell (1985) and Phillips and Park (1988).
28present analysis at the 5% level, and therefore suggest that the collective setting does not
seem to ﬁt the empirical evidence shown by our sample.18
8 Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical contribution to the wide "unitary vs. collective" model
debate that has arisen over the past 20 years in family economics. In particular, we test
the parametric restrictions imposed by the collective labour supply model considering the
diﬀerences in education level between the members of the couple as a potential distribu-
tion factor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to use this kind of
information on education to test this version of the labour supply model due to Chiappori.
Moreover, the quadratic speciﬁcation that we propose for the labour supply system also
allows the restrictions imposed by the unitary model to be tested.
We conclude that our sample drawn from the Spanish version of the ECHP for the
period from 1994 to 1999 clearly rejects the restriction of non-existence of distribution
factors. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i ti ss h o w nt h a tt h ed i ﬀerences in education play an important role in
both members’ labour supply decisions according to the distribution factor interpretation.
This result is in line with previous studies that indicate that the unitary model should not
be used to analyse household behaviour. However, we also reject the restriction imposed
by the collective model with a distribution factor. This outcome suggests that even
though there are variables that can inﬂuence household behaviour through their eﬀects
on individuals’ decision power, the collective setting is not adequate for modelling such
intrahousehold considerations.
Furthermore, since this analysis contradicts many papers that have accepted the collec-
tive model’s restrictions using diﬀerent datasets (Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Bourguignon
et al. (1994), Browning et al. (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002), Fernández-Val (2003)), it
shows that more empirical research is needed in order to reach a deﬁnite consensus about
the appropriateness of the collective model for analysing intrahousehold behaviour.
18In line with our results, Aronsson et al.(2001) reject both the unitary model and the collective model
where household production can be traded using Swedish data from 1984 and 1993.
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y  =0which are
observable variables that can therefore be estimated. Then, the following results hold: (i)
If there exists exactly one distribution factor such that C  = D, the following conditions
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30(ii) Under the assumptions that conditions (A1a)-(A1h) hold, the partial derivatives


















Therefore, the sharing rule is deﬁn e du pt oa na d d i t i v ef u n c t i o nk(z) where z is the
set of preference factors.19
Proof: See Appendix in Chiappori et al. (2002).
19In the consumption setting, Blundell et al.(2004) extend the collective model considering a consump-
tion technology function. In that context, they show that, assuming that individual ordinal preferences
do not change after marriage and provided that there exist more than three goods, the sharing rule can
be nonparametrically full identiﬁed using consumption data on singles and couples. In addition, Couprie
(2003) estimates a collective model of demand for leisure that includes the production of a household
public good using the British Household Panel Survey for the period from 1992 to 2000. Under this set-
ting, she shows that the sharing rule conditional to public expenditures can be identiﬁed by the woman’s
changes in family status (from single to married or vice versa).
31Appendix B
Table 5 presents some descriptive statisti c so ft h ev a r i a b l e su s e di nt h i sa n a l y s i s :
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
M e nW o m e n M e nW o m e nM e nW o m e n M e nW o m e n
Hours of work (1) 42.46 36.80 8.10 7.84 20 15 91 72
Hourly wage (2) 6.19 5.24 3.17 2.47 0.71 0.42 27.17 18.59
A g e 4 03 8 0 . 8 3 0 . 7 8 2 12 1 6 46 2
Educ1 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.48 0 0 1 1
Educ2 0.27 0.24 0.44 0.42 0 0 1 1
Educ3 0.34 0.38 0.47 0.48 0 0 1 1
Y e a r s o f s e r v i c e 1 0 . 79 . 1 96 . 2 16 . 1 30 0 1 9 1 9
Households
Children<60 . 3 1 0 . 5 5 0 3
Children6-18 0.82 0.95 0 5
Nonlabour income (2) 443.40 1404.27 0 24951.25
Distribution Factor 4.91 1.99 1 9
Note: Number of observations, 1879 couples. (1) Weekly hours of work. (2) Euros.
According to the data men are, on average, older, work more hours per week and earn
higher wages than women, while women are slightly more highly educated.
Appendix C
In this Appendix, we provide a brief explanation of the two-stage Heckman-type selec-
tion correction that we implement in order to avoid sample selection biases in the empirical
results. In particular, we apply this method taking into account the endogeneity of wages
(for further details, see Wooldridge (2002)). This procedure has two steps. First, we
specify a Probit model for the participation decision of each member. Speciﬁcally, we
consider that an individual participates (the dependent binary variable takes the value
one) if she continuously works during the whole year. We include household nonlabour
income, the fertility variables, a second-order polynomial in age, dummy variables for
high school schooling and graduate studies (Educ2,Educ3) and their interactions with
that polynomial as explanatory variables in each Probit model. Obviously, we do not
include wages since they are endogenous variables in the structural equations of interest.
32We estimate both Probit models using the whole sample of working and non-working cou-
ples and we compute each individual’s inverse Mills ratio (the predicted λ-term). Table
6 presents the estimation results for the Probit models:
Table 6. Probit Participation models.





























Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. Number of observations, 10559.
(*) Signiﬁcant at 10%. (**) Signiﬁcant at 5%. Age has been divided by 10.
From these results, we should stress that women with children are more likely to
be nonparticipants in the labour market and that household nonlabour income has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the probability of being working in both equations.
Second, using the sample of continuously working couples, we estimate the empirical
labour supply system including each individual’s inverse Mills ratio in both the list of
regressors and the list of instruments that correspond to each member’s labour supply
equation.
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